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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago the American Law Institute had just pub-
lished Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' As a
consequence of this new and innovative rule, the theory of recov-
ery in the area of defective products was expanded from a system
based upon principles of negligence and warranty to one that also
included the doctrine of strict product liability. The promulgation
of Section 402A marked the beginning of a growing revolution in
the field of plaintiff-oriented litigation. Under this new section,
parties and courts are no longer required to focus upon the conduct
of the defendant or principles set forth by the law of warranty. In-
stead, parties and courts frequently center their inquiry upon the
defectiveness of the product and issues related thereto. Unfortu-
1. Section 402A states:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
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nately, since the advent of Section 402A, the American legal sys-
tem has not perfected one uniform doctrine governing recovery. In
some instances, states have set forth rules particular to their own
jurisdictions.2 Some symmetry has evolved, however, and it is the
purpose of this essay to discuss the development of these principles
during the last two and one-half decades.
II. BACKGROUND
The first fact that should be emphasized is that Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts did not appear unexpectedly. As
far back as the 1940s, concurring decisions calling for the imple-
mentation of strict liability when injury was caused by a defective
product began to appear. Various legal scholars also supported this
position. However, it was not until 1962, when Justice Roger Tray-
nor of the Supreme Court of California wrote his decision in
Greenman v. Yuba,3 that the principle acquired a semblance of au-
thority. Greenman was the first case to impose strict product liabil-
ity upon a manufacturer. Two years later, using this decision as a
foundation, the American Law Institute (ALI) approved the final
draft of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section
402A was officially adopted the following year in 1965. Interest-
ingly, this adoption was the first time in the history of the Restate-
ment that a section was promulgated without the support of a
majority or minority position. This fact, and the criticism that the
ALI had usurped a legislative function by creating a new cause of
action, did not prevent an almost universal acceptance of the rule.
The resulting development, however, appears to have extended the
concept of strict product liability much further than was originally
planned.
III. "ONE WHO SELLS..."
From the beginning, Section 402A was intended to apply only to
persons who were involved in the sale of goods. In contrast, indi-
viduals rendering services would continue to be held to the stan-
dard of the reasonably prudent person on the theory that no more
2. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 701 (N.J. 1969) (allowing strict prod-
uct liability action in situations in which defendant has provided service).
3. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
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accountability could be expected of them. The decision to hold
sellers strictly liable for sales of defective products can be justified
on a number of grounds. First, a seller engaged in the business of
selling goods for profit should bear the burden of defectiveness as a
cost of doing business. Second, the liability of a merchant can be
passed on to the consumer as part of the selling price, or, in an
appropriate situation, restitution may be obtained from the original
supplier. Sellers are also in a position to correct and control non-
compliance and nonconformity when goods are in their possession.
Finally, strict product liability is a loss for which insurance may be
obtained. All of these reasons have been asserted at one time or
another as the basis for imposing strict product liability upon a
seller of defective goods.
It did not take long for the argument to be made that, in today's
economy, anything sold may also be leased. New Jersey was one of
the first jurisdictions to take note of this phenomenon. In Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Services,4 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey reasoned that strict product liability should and would
be imposed upon the lessor of defective goods. The logic for this
position was that such a supplier placed merchandise into the mar-
ketplace in much the same way as any seller, and, therefore, all of
the reasons for imposing strict product liability applied. The rule
was extended to bailment transactions and soon thereafter was ap-
plied to other nonsale situations such as demonstrations and free
samples.5 Today, as a result of these early decisions and those deci-
sions that followed, the view that the application of strict product
liability is no longer limited to "one who sells," but instead is ap-
plied to "one who places into the stream of commerce," is well
established.
4. 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965).
5. See First Nat'l Bank v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So. 2d 966, 968 (Ala. 1978) (ex-
tending liability to products merely placed into stream of commerce). The court discussed
the "market cycle," and stated:
When a product is placed in the "stream of commerce," the marketing cycle as it were,
whether by demonstration, lease, free sample or sale, the doctrine should attach. In
each of these situations the profit motive of the manufacturer is apparent whether or
not a "sale" in the strict sense takes place. Moreover, the manufacturer who enters
the market is in a better position to know and correct defects in his product and as
between him and his prospective consumers should bear the risk of injury to those
prospective consumers when any such defects enter the market uncorrected.
Id.
[Vol. 25:327
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IV. "[A]NY PRODUCT..."
As stated previously, individuals rendering services are held to
the standard of actionable negligence. As a rule, these people are
held to practice inexact sciences and, therefore, should only be re-
quired to exercise the judgment of a reasonably prudent person.
Unlike those individuals who place goods into the stream of com-
merce, individuals rendering services should not be held to the ex-
acting standard of strict product liability. However, various
problems are inherent in such a simple rule.
One of the first problems encountered is the hybrid sales/service
transaction, in which the issue is whether the bargain-admittedly
mixed-is for the sale of goods or for the rendering of a service.
This issue is a problem that previously had been faced under the
Uniform Commercial Code and its predecessor, the Uniform Sales
Act. These codes were applied in the realm of contract, but the
issue is the same under Section 402A, which applies in the area of
tort. All three provisions apply only to the sale of goods. In other
words, services are excluded. When determining whether strict
product liability was applicable, the courts, borrowing from the
precedent that had been established in earlier cases, relied upon
various standards. The standard that achieved the most promi-
nence was the "predominant factor" test. In essence, the question
when applying this test becomes one of whether the controlling
motivation for entering the transaction is the procurement of a ser-
vice or the purchase of goods. As a general rule, if the seller's ex-
pertise, knowledge, or experience in any way influences the
purchaser, the transaction is held to be one for services. This issue,
more often than not, is answered by the jury.
One notable exception to this type of hybrid transaction con-
cerns the purchase of blood. At first, the various jurisdictions were
evenly divided on whether one who purchased a transfusion had
paid for a product or a service. It is easy to see both sides of the
issue, largely because blood is unique. Not only does blood save
lives, but it is also a commodity which will be destroyed if tested
for every conceivable illness it can transmit. This fact, and the ad-
vent of diseases such as AIDS, caused virtually every jurisdiction to
adopt legislative protection for blood banks in the form of blood
shield statutes. As a rule, these laws provide that in transactions
involving blood, actionable negligence is the only basis for recov-
ery. This provision is an efficient, although arguably inequitable,
1993]
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way to solve the problem of whether the bargain is for a service or
the sale of a product.
A second area of concern involves used products. The Restate-
ment is silent on this point, and, as a result, the states once again
have gone in two different directions. Some states follow the con-
cept that strict product liability should not be applied to this type
of transaction because a used product is no longer within the origi-
nal production and marketing scheme. As a result, two of the main
reasons for imposing Section 402A are absent: the ability of the
seller to seek restitution from the original manufacturer, and the
manufacturer's ability to treat such liability as a cost of doing busi-
ness. In effect, the seller of a used product, if held strictly liable,
would become an insurer. The Restatement was never intended to
impose absolute liability upon a seller of defective goods.
Other states impose strict product liability in this type of transac-
tion and argue that the Restatement makes no distinction between
products that are new and those that are used. The Restatement
speaks merely in terms of "[o]ne who sells any product," and, as a
result, no exception should be made for this type of commodity. In
addition, the argument is made that sellers of used products are
motivated by profit, and the cost of defectiveness, therefore,
should be imposed upon them rather than the innocent injured
consumers. The dichotomy of views on used products is interest-
ing, especially because both sides are supported by logic as well as
precedent.
The third area in which this part of Section 402A has had an
impact involves real estate transactions. Laypersons as well as law
students think of real estate as the antithesis of goods, and yet
some courts have had little difficulty in extending the concept of
strict product liability to houses 6 as well as to land. 7 Houses are
often mass-produced in the sense that they may be erected one
block at a time: the first block is nothing but foundations; the sec-
ond, foundations plus sides; the third, foundations, sides, and roofs;
the fourth, foundations, sides, roofs, and interiors; and so on. The
6. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 325 (N.J. 1965) (holding that no
meaningful difference exists between mass production of homes and mass production of
automobiles).
7. See Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639
(1969) (applying strict product liability to house lots that subsided because of defective
subsurface conditions).
[Vol. 25:327
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houses are no different from automobiles constructed in an assem-
bly plant. Courts taking note of this similarity reason that strict
product liability should be applied. The same reasoning holds true
when large tracts of land are mass-developed-situations in which
land is cleared, utilities are installed, and streets are paved. If or-
ganized in a methodical procedure, the development resembles an
assembly line. The result of these decisions is to end with a dis-
torted position in relationship to the meaning of "product."
In years to come, the real question may be how far the courts
will go in extending the definition of "product." In addition to land
and houses, diverse commodities such as electricity,8 water,9 com-
ponent parts, 10 and defective ideas1 ' have all been held to consti-
tute products. In all of these cases the courts have avoided the
dictionary's approach to defining the subject matter, and have in-
stead decided each case upon the basis of whether strict product
liability should be applied. Once that decision is made by applying
the policy reasons for the rule, the subject of the litigation is cate-
gorized as a product. As illustrated, this process has produced
some unusual decisions, and there is no way to determine the ex-
tent to which future plaintiffs will seek to extend the term "any
product."
V. "[I]IN A DEFECTIVE CONDITION..."
Originally, the phrase "in a defective condition" was one of the
most difficult parts of Section 402A for the courts to apply. This
predicament was caused in large part by the occasional near-impos-
sibility of drawing the line between the proverbial "lemon" and a
product that is "in a defective condition." This problem was exac-
erbated by the idea that all products are capable of inflicting in-
8. See Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283,
292 (1985) (holding that electricity is "force like the wind" and is therefore classified as
product).
9. See Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that § 402A is applicable to sale of water).
10. See Scott G. Night, Comment, Products Liability: Component Part Manufacturer's
Liability for Design and Warning Defects, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 215,226 (1988) (finding that
majority of jurisdictions hold manufacturers of component parts liable under § 402A).
11. See Andrew T. Bayman, Note, Strict Liability for Defective Ideas in Publications,
42 VAND. L. REv. 557, 564 (1989) (discussing evolution of strict liability for defective
ideas).
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jury,12 and no product is technologically perfect. 13 Also adding to
the confusion was the courts' initial uncertainty on the notion that
a product may be defective because it has been misdesigned, mis-
manufactured, or mismarketed. This ambiguity was amplified be-
cause the idea had not yet been established that a test for
determining one aspect of defectiveness might not be the best test
for determining others. A "defective condition" was clearly re-
quired, though, for liability to attach. From the beginning, the lia-
bility imposed by Section 402A was not absolute but, instead, strict.
The difference is that strict liability is imposed not because the
plaintiff has been injured, but because the injury sustained was
caused by a defective product placed into the stream of commerce
by the defendant. The decisions rendered during the early years
were somewhat confusing. Once the concept of defectiveness be-
came clear, however, well-established standards evolved. Perhaps
the best way to illustrate the subsequent development in this area
is to discuss each facet of the problem separately.
A. Mismanufactured Products
A product that has been mismanufactured may be defective for
one of two reasons. First, the raw materials used in its construction
may be substandard,'14 or, in the alternative, the product may have
been misassembled. 5 In either instance, the product stands alone
because it differs from the rest of the manufacturer's production.
The "reasonable expectations test" soon emerged as the best test
for determining defectiveness in this type of situation. Under this
test, the determining factor is whether the product, as introduced
into the stream of commerce, meets the reasonable expectations of
the ordinary user-consumer.
The most common methods for determining reasonable expecta-
tions are by reference to product usage (i.e., the purpose for which
12. Some of the more inane examples may be a ball-point pen, a necktie, or the plastic
covering that accompanies dry cleaning.
13. One need only to consider the automobile sitting in the driveway, or perhaps the
myriad products encountered in our daily existence, to agree with this statement.
14. See Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1972) (evaluating evi-
dence that defendant's supplier used "dirty" steel to manufacture defective fan blades).
15. The classic example in this situation would be the product with the loose bolt or
missing screw. Something is missing or different from the rest of the defendant's
production.
[Vol. 25:327
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the product is ordinarily employed), product characteristics (i.e.,
the most common features or traits of the commodity), and the
manufacturer's advertisements (i.e., representations or allegations
made by the manufacturer concerning the product). These meth-
ods work hand-in-hand in determining what the reasonable con-
sumer expects when using the product. If this expectation is
breached, the jury in any subsequent litigation may determine that
the product was in a defective condition.
This reasonable-expectations test has not been applied univer-
sally. In instances in which products such as food are involved, the
courts may utilize other standards. Here, the "foreign-natural doc-
trine" is also used to determine if a product is defective. Under the
foreign-natural test, the jury determines whether the allegedly
adulterated food contains a "natural" substance, such as a kernel of
corn in corn flakes, or a "foreign" substance, such as a burr in a can
of peas. 6 In the last twenty-five years, the reasonable expectations
test, even in cases involving food, has emerged as the most gener-
ally used test when determining whether a product is
mismanufactured.
B. Misdesigned Products
While a decision of mismanufacture isolates one product, a find-
ing of misdesign condemns the manufacturer's entire line of pro-
duction. For this reason, the courts have exercised more caution in
this latter area. As a result, at one time or another, different stan-
dards for the determination of defectiveness have been advanced.
At various times, the tests have been: whether the product fulfilled
reasonable consumer expectations (the same test that emerged as
the prevailing approach in mismanufacturing cases); whether a rea-
sonably prudent manufacturer would have introduced the product
into the stream of commerce if the allegedly defective condition
had been known; whether the commodity was unreasonably dan-
gerousness; and whether the risk created by the product out-
16. See Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 59 P.2d 144, 148 (Cal. 1936) (recognizing question
for jury as to whether food is fit for human consumption). In Mix, the Supreme Court of
California was the first court to hold that a chicken bone in a chicken pie could not be
called a foreign substance, and, therefore, its presence should have been anticipated. Id.
Thus, the dish was not unfit for human consumption. Id.
1993]
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weighed its utility. 17 At one time or another, all of the tests, with
various combinations of these factors, have been employed.
The last test, designated as the risk-benefit analysis, has emerged
as the standard most frequently used in the area of misdesign. This
analysis assumes that the seller intended to place the product into
the marketplace in its present condition. In any subsequent litiga-
tion calling into issue the question of defectiveness, the court en-
gages in a balancing of the risk involved in the use of the product
against the burden of, at least, reducing or, at best, eliminating,
that risk. The court then measures this outcome against the benefit
to society that would ensue from a safer product. Only if the court
determines that the resulting benefit outweighs the burden is the
product judged to be defective.
The issue of defectiveness is typically one for the jury, which
often analyzes the question of burden on the basis of an alternative
design. Comparing the existing product with a substitute takes into
consideration such factors as increased cost, marketability, state-of-
the-art or technological feasibility, and, of course, resulting safety.
On the other hand, the question of benefit concerns itself only with
the issue of reduced risk. The general acceptance of this test in the
area of misdesign is easy to understand. In essence, it is a standard
in which the burden of redesigning the product is measured against
the resulting benefits. The test is easy to apply in cases in which an
alteration, addition, modification, or deletion in the existing com-
modity will result in increased safety.
The issues of misuse and obvious dangers are related to product
defectiveness. Each may be defensive in nature. As a general rule,
whether the misuse of a product constitutes a defense to an allega-
tion of defectiveness depends upon the foreseeability of such mal-
treatment. If, for example, a manufacturer places a product into
the stream of commerce and misuse could or should be foreseen is
the manufacturer will remain liable for resulting injuries. If, how-
ever, such misuse is not foreseeable, the defendant will be exoner-
17. See John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability for Products: Past, Present and Future, 13
CAP. U. L. REv. 335, 345 (1984) (discussing standards used in determining whether product
is misdesigned).
18. The classic example of misuse of a product is standing on a chair. Everyone
knows that chairs are designed, manufactured, and marketed for the purpose of being used
as a device for sitting. However, everyone at one time or another has stood on a chair.
This type of use is a most foreseeable misuse of a product.
[Vol. 25:327
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ated of liability. This rule is both logical and fair. An individual
should not be held accountable when a product is used in a manner
which was not only unintended, but never anticipated. On the
other hand, if the misuse was expected, the manufacturer should
have made allowances for this deviation and, having failed to do so,
should be held accountable for resulting injuries.
The issue of an obvious danger is more complex than product
misuse. This issue arises when a product has a patently obvious
risk inherent in its use-for example, a glass-crushing machine
without a guard. The peril comes as a surprise to no one. And as a
result, the plaintiff's contributory negligence in self-exposure to the
danger must be factored into the damaging event. The reason for
doing so is that public policy dictates that the law not reward man-
ufacturers for placing a product with an obvious flaw in its design
into the stream of commerce. They must be encouraged to perfect
their goods. In any subsequent litigation, the question becomes
one of whether reasonably prudent persons would have exposed
themselves to the risk. There may be some situations in which the
plaintiff had no choice, and as a result acted prudently in using the
product.19 In other cases, reasonable alternatives may have been
available. If reasonable alternatives were available, there is little
doubt of the presence of contributory negligence, which should di-
minish the amount of defendant's liability.
As in the area of mismanufacture, no universally accepted test in
the area of misdesign exists. The risk-benefit analysis, however,
has acquired the largest following and appears to be the best analy-
sis for the particular issue of misdesign.
C. Mismarketed Products
The third type of defectiveness concerns mismarketing, which in-
volves the adequacy of the instructions and warnings accompany-
ing the product, and which deals with a product's effective and safe
use. As in the case of misdesign, a mismarketed product is one the
19. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976). The plaintiff was injured while
operating a high-speed printing press. He was able to introduce evidence that it was the
custom to remove imperfections from the material being printed while the press was in
motion. This procedure was referred to as "chasing hickies on the run." The justification
was that "[o]nce the machine was stopped, it required at least three hours to resume print-
ing and, in such event, the financial advantage of the high-speed machine would be less-
ened." Id.
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defendant intended to introduce into the stream of commerce in its
present condition. Once again, the most widely used test that has
emerged for determining the question of defectiveness is the risk-
benefit analysis. In this instance, however, the test is not con-
cerned with an alternative design. Instead, the question is whether
existing instructions or warnings are sufficient. The risk inherent in
the use of the product in its present condition is measured against
the burden of any additional warnings or instructions. In view of
this burden, the question is whether the resulting benefit to society,
i.e., a safer product, requires the inclusion of additional informa-
tion. If the jury subsequently determines that such data should
have been included, the product is one which has been mis-
marketed. Because it is impossible to warn or instruct of all possi-
ble risks inherent in the use of a particular item, the real questions
in these cases are: What quantum of data is sufficient? What must
be included in order to justify a finding of adequacy?
It is easy to fall prey to the conclusion that any resulting benefit
justifies the burden of an additional warning or instruction. How
burdensome could this additional information be? Because of this
reasoning, the rule of diminishing returns must be considered. If
instructions or warnings are voluminous, and the manufacturer in-
cludes too much information, the user-consumer may disregard all
such statements. The solution, although circuitous, is to include the
information that would satisfy the reasonably prudent person. This
determination will usually be a question of fact for the jury.
To whom should the information be given? The information
should be given to all foreseeable plaintiffs. However, reasonable
minds may differ in defining this group. Moreover, different duties
may be owed to different members of this class, for a product is
capable of inflicting injury as it passes through the various stages of
its marketing scheme. A product may endanger prospective plain-
tiffs while being displayed,2° demonstrated, or used. Warnings
must be adequate to guard against harm in each of those circum-
stances and perhaps more. The problem can be very complex at
times and often seems clearer in retrospect. Nevertheless, the rule
20. See Davis v. Gibson Prod. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (raising issue of inadequate warnings when potential buyer suffered
injury while inspecting machete on display in store).
[Vol. 25:327
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mandating adequate warnings to all foreseeable plaintiffs is well
established and enjoys a majority following.
A unique problem arises in the marketing of drugs and other
products that can cause an allergic reaction in the user-consumer.
As a general rule, drugs are one of two types: those drugs generic
in nature that are sold over the counter, and those that may be
dispensed only by prescription. If the drug is sold over the counter,
all warnings and instructions should be directed, as a rule, to the
potential user in order to satisfy the manufacturer's obligation. If,
however, the drug in question is a prescription drug, the law re-
quires that all warnings and instructions be given to the prescribing
physician, who is viewed as a "learned intermediary." The reason
for this rule is that the doctor deals with patients one-on-one and is
in a better position to discuss potential problems, which are known
to an individual with experience and expertise, but which the ordi-
nary layman may not anticipate. As with many general rules, there
are exceptions, the most notable of which involves the use of pre-
scription drugs that presumably will be dispensed by individuals
other than the family doctor-for example, drugs for mass inocula-
tions. In this situation, even though dealing with a prescription
drug, the courts have stated that the warnings, if any, should be
given directly to the consumer. The reason for this exception is
that the "learned intermediary" may not be present, and the pa-
tient should be warned of any adverse reactions of which the
layperson may not know or suspect.
When dealing with goods that cause allergic reactions, various
states have endorsed three positions. The first position, which is
the majority rule, is that there is no duty to warn of any idiosyn-
cratic reaction unless an "appreciable number" of individuals who
would be affected by the product in question exist. The second
position, which has a respectable following, is that it is a question
of fact for the jury to determine whether there is a need to issue an
adequate warning where "some," because of their own peculiar
chemistry, will sustain harm from using the product. Finally, the
third and strictest position of all, which represents a minority posi-
tion, requires a warning in any situation where "a" person will suf-
fer adverse consequences.
Obvious dangers and misuse should be mentioned also in regard
to marketing. Each was previously discussed in conjunction with
design defects. In marketing goods, unlike with misdesigned prod-
1993]
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ucts, there is no duty to warn of obvious risks or perils. One court
best explained the nonexistence of such duty: "We hardly believe
it is anymore necessary to tell an experienced factory worker that
he should not put his hand into a machine that is at that moment
breaking glass than it would be necessary to tell a zookeeper to
keep his head out of a hippopotamus' mouth. '2 1 The rule concern-
ing the absence of a duty to warn of an obvious danger when mar-
keting a product is simple, but, like many simple truths, may be
difficult to apply. The real question often is whether the danger is
obvious. In many instances the potential existence of danger
presents a question of fact for the jury. If the jury determines that
the plaintiff was confronted with an obvious risk, the manufacturer
is exonerated of liability based on failure to warn.
Misuse is treated in the same manner in mismarketing cases as it
is in misdesign. Here again the focus is on foreseeability. If the
misuse was reasonably anticipated, and any product clearly is sus-
ceptible of being used in a manner other than that which was in-
tended by the manufacturer, there is a duty on the part of the
manufacturer to warn of any risk or harm that might result. If,
however, the misuse was not foreseeable, the manufacturer, as in
the case of obvious risks, is not liable.
The law undoubtedly has progressed during the last twenty-five
years. The requirement of defectiveness appears to mean much
more than originally may have been intended. Not only may a
product be defective on any of three different grounds, but diver-
gent positions have emerged in individual states on how these rules
should be applied in determining "in a defective condition."2 2
VI. "[U]NREASONABLY DANGEROUS..."
The drafters of Section 402A included the term "unreasonably
dangerous" in order to distinguish among: products that are capa-
21. Bartkewich v. Billinger, 247 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1968).
22. Some readers may feel that the author has omitted a great deal on the develop-
ment and subsequent emergence of the various tests for determining defectiveness. Space
limitations have necessitated a short-hand rendition of this particular facet. For example,
there is no mention of products possessing "useful dangers," such as sharp knives, fast cars,
and potent poisons, whose characteristics making them dangerous are the same character-
istics for which they are purchased. Likewise not included are the unavoidably unsafe
products, such as certain medicines. Therefore, only the history of product liability law
with respect to the term "in a defective condition" is highlighted.
[Vol. 25:327
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
ble of causing injury even though nothing is wrong with them;
products which, even though flawed, cause no harm; and products
which are unreasonably dangerous because of their defective con-
dition. Because any product is capable of inflicting injury, the
drafters intended to impose strict product liability only in the latter
situation. There was, however, a consensus that commodities such
as butter, eggs, whiskey, cigarettes, and automobiles, and many
other types of goods that can cause harm regardless of their condi-
tion be excluded from the ramifications of strict product liability.
In addition, other products may be flawed, not functioning as ex-
pected, and yet causing no injury-for example, a camera flash that
fails to provide illumination. These kinds of goods must be distin-
guished from commodities that are unreasonably dangerous be-
cause of their defective condition. In other words, an injured
plaintiff must prove that the product was defective and, as a result
of such defect, was in a condition that was unreasonably danger-
ous. The plaintiff meets this requirement by showing that because
of the defect (in any or all three of the phases mentioned above),
the product fails to meet the reasonable expectations of the user-
consumer, regardless of the standard employed to determine
defectiveness.
Some states have refused to enforce this two-tiered standard,
reasoning that it places too much of a burden upon the plaintiff.2 3
The majority position in the country, however, requires that an in-
jured plaintiff prove both the defect and the resulting unreasonably
dangerous condition.
VII. "[T]o THE USER OR CONSUMER OR TO HIS PROPERTY..."
One of the arguments advanced for the adoption of Section
402A was the inability of the law of warranty to deal in an ade-
quate manner with those individuals who were not in privity with
the person who had placed the product into the stream of com-
merce. From its inception, product liability law, which in essence
consisted of breach of warranty and actionable negligence, had re-
23. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1163 (Cal. 1972) (concluding that
to require proof of both product defect and unreasonably dangerous condition places
greater burden on injured plaintiff than is required in Greenman).
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quired a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant.24
This relationship was viewed as necessary in order to curtail a flood
of litigation that might have endangered the Industrial Revolution.
The requirement of privity was to protect fledgling industries and
established manufacturers from law suits filed by remote plaintiffs.
But as times changed the law changed. Consumers no longer deal
face-to-face with the butcher, baker, and candlestick maker. To-
day's marketplace is one in which all manufacturers are remote,
and, in some cases, unknown. As a result, the requirement of priv-
ity began to wane. By providing that relief was available if the
user, the consumer, or the property of either sustained injury, Sec-
tion 402A extinguished the privity requirement. Today, privity is
generally not an issue, whether a plaintiff's action is in warranty,
actionable negligence, or strict product liability.
The courts, by allowing innocent bystanders to recover, have
once again extended the parameters of the Section beyond the
original text. Section 402A speaks in terms of injury to "the user
or consumer or to his property," and yet the courts have had little
difficulty in extending this provision to include the innocent by-
stander. Two reasons exist for this extension of liability. First, to
do so imposes no additional burden upon the manufacturers, who
are already required to protect users and consumers. To include
third parties imposes no additional precautions. Second, principles
of fair play and equity compel protection of these individuals, who
have no say in the selection of the product and do not participate in
its inspection. Furthermore, innocent bystanders have no influence
on the manner in which the product is used. As a consequence,
they, more than anyone else, should be protected by the law.
Hence, even though the Restatement does not mention recovery by
innocent third-party bystanders, they are allowed to utilize Section
402A.
24. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404-05 (1842) (holding that with-
out privity of contract, law would provide means of letting in "infinity of actions" leading
to "absurd and outrageous consequences").
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VIII. "[I]s SUBJECT TO LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
THEREBY CAUSED TO THE ULTIMATE USER OR
CONSUMER, OR TO HIS PROPERTY..."
From a casual reading, the intent of Section 402A to compensate
users and consumers for physical harm, as well as for injury to their
property, may appear obvious. Yet the courts, once again, have
extended the provisions of Section 402A to include compensation
for economic loss. The first court to apply the rule in this manner
was the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc.25
The plaintiff's only loss in this case was the cost of the carpet
purchased. After the carpet had been installed, the plaintiff dis-
covered that the dyeing process was defective. A dark line ap-
peared in the middle of the rug, and, as the pile wore down, the
line became more apparent. In the subsequent suit, a unanimous
court reasoned that the plaintiff could maintain a cause of action
against the manufacturer on either of two causes of action: breach
of an implied warranty of fitness, or strict product liability. The
court found that Section 402A would apply in this case because
manufacturers should bear any and all losses caused by a defective
product that they placed into the stream of commerce.
Then, four months after Santor, the Supreme Court of California
rejected the idea of applying strict product liability to economic
losses. In Seely v. White Motor Co.,26 the plaintiff brought suit to
recover for, among other injuries, loss of business when the truck
he had purchased overturned as a result of defective brakes. Jus-
tice Traynor, writing for the majority, made it clear that the provi-
sions of the Restatement apply only when the injuries in question
relate to the safety of the product, not to a contractual frustration.
He reasoned that economic loss sounded in contract, not in tort.
As a result, the California court held that Section 402A should not
be extended to compensate an injured plaintiff for this kind of loss.
After an initial tug-of-war between these two opposing positions,
Seely now seems to represent the majority opinion in the country.
The majority rule is that for economic loss, strict product liability,
which is a recovery in tort, does not apply. Some jurisdictions con-
25. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
26. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
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tinue to allow recovery of an economic loss under Section 402A if
other injuries have been sustained.27 They reason that, in a suit of
this sort, the economic frustration is part of the damaging event,
and the resulting judgment should therefore compensate the plain-
tiff for this harm.
Punitive damages also represent an example of the extension of
Section 402A beyond its original text. Nowhere does Section 402A
mention exemplary damages. Such damages can hardly be implied
from the phrase "is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property." And
yet, the courts have had little difficulty in awarding punitive
damages.
IX. "[I]F (A) THE SELLER IS ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF
SELLING SUCH A PRODUCT . . .9
The requirement that the defendant be engaged in the business
of selling the product that caused injury has been extended slightly.
As mentioned above, the law no longer limits liability to one who
sells, but instead holds liable any person in the business of placing
into the stream of commerce a product that, because of its defect,
causes injury. Liability attaches whether such placement be by
lease, bailment, gift, or other means. One interpretation of Section
402A that has remained constant, however, is that it was never in-
tended to and does not apply to one who engages in an occasional
sale.28 In other words, the isolated transaction will not impose
strict product liability, and an injured plaintiff will have to seek a
remedy under some other cause of action. The reasons for this rule
are varied. Some commentators feel that nonmerchants are not in
27. See Page Keeton, Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1978) (discussing case law concerning
strict liability for pure economic loss).
A distinction should be made between the type of "dangerous condition" that causes
damage only to the product itself and the type that is dangerous to other property or
persons. A hazardous product that has harmed something or someone can be labeled
as part of the accident problem; tort law seeks to protect against this type of harm
through allocation of risk. In contrast, a damaging event that harms only the product
should be treated as irrelevant to policy considerations directing liability placement in
tort.
Id. at 5.
28. An individual's garage sale and a savings and loan association's sale of a repos-
sessed boat are illustrative of the types of transactions to which § 402A was never intended
to apply.
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a position to warrant the imposition of such liability.
Nonmerchants cannot exercise any control over the original manu-
facturer, nor are they able to correct any deficiencies in the prod-
uct. Furthermore, their not being business entities prevents
nonmerchants from allocating such cost as an item of overhead and
passing it on to the consumer, as well as inhibits their ability to
obtain appropriate liability insurance. In short, none of the rea-
sons for imposing strict product liability is present.
X. "[A]ND (B) IT IS EXPECTED TO AND DOES REACH THE USER
OR CONSUMER WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE
CONDITION IN WHICH IT IS SOLD."
In addition to establishing (1) that the product is in a defective
condition and as a result is unreasonably dangerous, and (2) that
defendant is in the business of placing goods of this sort into the
stream of commerce, an injured plaintiff must also be able to allege
and prove (3) that the injury-causing commodity was in its defec-
tive condition at the time it was placed into the marketplace. This
requirement is both logical and fair. Any other position would im-
pose absolute rather than strict liability. As previously discussed,
the defendant is held liable not because the plaintiff has been
harmed. Instead, liability is predicated upon the fact that the de-
fendant introduced a product into the stream of commerce which,
because of its defect, caused injury. It was never the intent of the
Restatement drafters to make the seller an insurer. Therefore, a
showing that the product was tampered with, or in any way altered,
after it left the seller's possession will operate as a defense and
exoneration from liability. In this instance, the courts have closely
followed the intent of Section 402A of the Restatement.
XI. "THE RULE STATED IN SECTION (1) APPLIES ALTHOUGH
(A) THE SELLER HAS EXERCISED ALL POSSIBLE CARE IN THE
PREPARATION AND SALE OF HIS PRODUCT . . ."
Negligence was never intended to be an issue in any suit brought
under Section 402A. Any argument that the defendant acted as a
reasonably prudent person is totally irrelevant. The sole basis of
Section 402A liability is strict product liability in respect to the de-
sign, manufacture, and marketing of the product. Many commen-
tators, however, have criticized the courts for employing
"negligence talk" when discussing the standards for determining
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defect. Some lawyers will admit that the terminology used for de-
termining negligence on the part of the defendant and defect in the
product can be the same. If there is uncertainty about what cause
of action a plaintiff is utilizing, it may be difficult to discern the
theory of recovery because many of the terms are identical. For
example, in the area of mismanufacture, courts speak in terms of
reasonable expectations. And in the area of misdesign and mis-
marketing, courts speak of the foreseeability of misuse as well as a
plaintiff's contributory negligence when confronted with an obvi-
ous danger. And finally, the courts speak of the foreseeable plain-
tiff when determining to whom warnings and instruction must be
given.
There are, however, two very important distinctions between the
two causes of action. First, under the Restatement, the focus is on
the condition of the product rather than on the behavior of the
defendants. Second, when discussing the element of foreseeability
under Section 402A, courts hold defendants not to the standard of
a reasonable person, but to the standard of an expert. As experts,
the defendants are charged with a higher degree of care and knowl-
edge. There are some facts which they are required to know.
There is no question of whether defendants could have or should
have foreseen-they knew. Aside from this occasional overlapping
of terms, there is no inquiry as to whether defendants acted as rea-
sonably prudent persons in that they "exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of [their] product." Under Section 402A,
whether the defendants' conduct constitutes negligence is
irrelevant.
XII. "[A]ND (B) THE USER OR CONSUMER HAS NOT BOUGHT
THE PRODUCT FROM OR ENTERED INTO ANY
CONTRACTUAL RELATION WITH THE SELLER."
The last part of Section 402A stresses the immateriality of the
absence of any contractual relationship between the parties. Priv-
ity, which was so essential in the early days of product liability law,
is no longer required under Section 402A. To paraphrase Dean
Prosser: The assault upon the citadel is complete.29
29. See William L. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960)
(discussing changes in strict liability law).
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XIII. DEFENSES
Defensive issues include obvious dangers, misuse, and the fact
that the product may have undergone some change after it left the
defendant's control. Of the other important developments in de-
fenses evolving during the last twenty-five years, perhaps the most
important concerns contributory negligence. Traditionally, the
plaintiff's negligence was not an issue in strict product liability liti-
gation; the issue arose only when recovery was attempted under
actionable negligence, and then, no matter how slight, it operated
as a total bar to recovery.
During the 1970s, mounting criticism of the harsh effect of the
rule of contributory negligence caused some courts, as well as the
legislatures of various states, to abandon this position and replace
contributory negligence with the concept of comparative negli-
gence. Under this revised system, the fault pertaining to the dam-
aging event is allocated between the parties, and the plaintiff's
recovery, instead of being barred, is simply diminished proportion-
ately. This allocation is a much more equitable way to distribute
the cost of harm; each party pays for that portion of the injury for
which he or she is responsible. This change in the law, while much
fairer from a plaintiff's perspective, managed to produce unusual
results in lawsuits brought on the alternate theories of actionable
negligence and strict product liability.
At first there was a problem in those cases in which plaintiffs
attempted to recover under the theory of actionable negligence.
The plaintiffs' contributory fault, now called comparative negli-
gence, reduced the amounts to which they were entitled. However,
their assumption of risk-knowing and appreciating the danger
and voluntarily exposing themselves to it-continued to operate as
a complete and total bar to recovery. This dichotomy was illogical,
and the courts were forced to move quickly. The solution, how-
ever, was easy: the defendant's defense of assumed risk was simply
incorporated into the theory of contributory negligence. When the
evidence warranted, the jury was asked to determine whether the
plaintiff was reasonable in confronting the peril in question.30 In
this way, the elements of assumed risk were forced to conform to
30. See Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. 1975) (declaring that
reasonableness of actor's conduct in confronting risk is to be determined under theory of
contributory negligence).
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the notion of comparative negligence, and the conflict which had
been so disturbing ceased to exist.
In lawsuits involving strict product liability, the plaintiffs' negli-
gence had never been an issue, and their assumption of the risk,
which had always been a defense, continued to operate as a total
bar. Adding to the disorder, the courts began to take note of plain-
tiffs' misuse of products and employed such conduct as a justifica-
tion for diminishing the final amount of the award. 31 As a result,
courts were once again faced with an unusual inconsistency. If a
plaintiff brought suit seeking to recover on the alternate theories of
actionable negligence and strict product liability, the defendant was
entitled to special issues on the plaintiff's negligence, assumed risk,
and misuse of the product. This entitlement meant that in the neg-
ligence action, assumed risk was subsumed into comparative fault,
which reduced the amount of recovery. In the strict product liabil-
ity action, however, assumed risk was a separate affirmative de-
fense which barred the plaintiff's recovery completely, whereas the
unforeseeable misuse of the product merely diminished the plain-
tiff's amount of damages. An additional problem arose because
the evidence used to establish the defense of unforeseeable misuse
in strict product liability could be, used also to establish contribu-
tory fault in suits based upon actionable negligence. Furthermore,
the courts had to face the fact that contributory negligence (now
known as comparative negligence) and misuse were one and the
same, posing a perplexing dilemma. In retrospect, however, the
solution in this instance was equally as simple as the one involving
assumed risk and contributory negligence: the courts just elimi-
nated the distinction. Both defenses--contributory negligence and
unforeseeable misuse of the product-were simply designated as
[H]enceforth in the trial of all actions based on negligence, volenti non fit injuria-he
who consents cannot receive an injury-or, as generally known, voluntary assumption
of risk will no longer be treated as an issue in actions based on negligence; but.., the
reasonableness of an actor's conduct in confronting a risk will be determined under
principles of contributory negligence. . . . Furthermore, since Texas has embraced
comparative negligence by legislative enactment, the intent to apportion negligence
rather than completely bar recovery is persuasive to an abandonment of the volenti
defenses. This has followed in the wake of comparative negligence in many
jurisdictions.
Id. at 538-39.
31. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977) (allowing
reduction in recovery for plaintiff's own foreseeable misuse of product).
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contributory negligence, a move easy to justify since both con-
cerned the plaintiff's conduct. This similarity, however, left the
problem of applying contributory negligence in a strict product lia-
bility suit and the inconsistent positions concerning assumed risk.
These problems too, however, were solved in an honest and
straightforward manner.
The argument for comparative negligence had always been that
it was motivated by "logic, justice, and fundamental fairness.
32
From the beginning, the basis for adopting this idea was to pro-
mote the notion of an equitable allocation of loss among the peo-
ple involved. The goal was to make all parties responsible in direct
proportion to their degree of fault. The answer was apparent.
Comparative fault should be applied in the area of strict product
liability litigation in the same manner as in negligence actions. This
application meant that assumed risk, unforeseeable misuse, and
contributory negligence should all be considered under the um-
brella of comparative fault. The resulting idea-that in strict prod-
uct liability actions, the plaintiff's contributory negligence was now
a defense-was accepted quickly. Today, whether by court deci-
sion, legislative action, or tort reform, this viewpoint represents the
majority position in the country. Contributory negligence, which
had never been applied outside of actions based upon negligence,
is now a defensive issue in strict product liability suits.
XIV. PREDICrIONS
No essay reflecting upon the changes that have taken place dur-
ing the last twenty-five years should conclude without a look into
the future. If the author were asked at the end of the next two and
one-half decades to repeat this exercise, an analysis of the follow-
ing predictions would be a good place to start. Where did the au-
thor think the developments would lead? And, what has actually
transpired? The American Law Institute has already begun a revi-
sion of Section 402A, and if the next generation of lawyers is as
productive and innovative as the last, there are bound to be some
astounding changes.
32. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978) (extending
comparative fault to strict product liability actions).
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One of these changes is sure to involve tobacco litigation. Ironi-
cally, from the beginning, cigarette companies have been able to
avoid liability owing to the unique characteristics of their product.
The companies argue that, at first, no one knew that smoking was
dangerous. After issuance of the Surgeon General's Report in
1964, everyone knew that smoking was hazardous to his health. As
a result, the product went from one for which liability was avoided
on the basis of unknown dangers to one for which recovery was
barred because the injured plaintiff was fully aware of the perils
involved. Underlying the defense of known risk is the fact that
federal law now mandates that each cigarette package warn the
user-consumer of the dangers of smoking. The fact remains, how-
ever, as one trial court recently stated, that when used for the pur-
pose for which they are intended, "[C]igarettes are the most lethal
product which may be legally sold in this country. Cigarettes are
defective because ... they cause cancer, emphysema, heart disease
and other illnesses. '33 Use of this product causes serious harm.
Notwithstanding these facts, many states have made recovery im-
possible in a suit of this kind by enacting legislation that isolates
tobacco companies from strict product liability. Someone, how-
ever, will eventually come forth with a theory of recovery that will
allow an injured plaintiff to prevail, and to prevail within the con-
fines of product liability law. Whether defectiveness is alleged in
the design, manufacture, or marketing of tobacco products, it must
be recognized that these products inflict serious injury. They are
addictive, cause property damage, pollute the air, and in many
cases are lethal. No one can argue that tobacco use provides any
resulting benefit to society.
Another development that is much more defensive in nature will
be the widespread acceptance of statutes of repose. Statutes of
limitation prevent the filing of a law suit x number of years after an
injury has been inflicted, or in the case of discovery statutes, x
number of years after the injury was discovered or should have
been discovered. Statutes of repose, on the other hand, bar a cause
33. See Legal Beat, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1993, at B5 (quoting decision by Washington
County Circuit Court Judge Eugene Bogen, in Greenville, Mississippi, holding that ciga-
rettes are defective and unreasonably dangerous). This decision has been called "so far out
of the mainstream that it has no precedential value." Id. However, antitobacco lawyers
are describing the case as "significant." Id.
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of action a stated number of years after the product has been intro-
duced into the stream of commerce, regardless of whether injury
has occurred. In effect, such statutes may bar litigation even
before injury. This type of protection, however, must be en-
couraged because it efficiently recognizes that all products, regard-
less of the technology involved, have a useful life. In other words,
after a certain period of time, every product eventually grows old
and dies. There has never been a "duty on a manufacturer to fur-
nish ... [goods] that will not wear out,"34 and a statute of repose,
or a "useful life defense," would recognize this phenomenon.
From a manufacturer's perspective this defense is logical and rea-
sonable. No one should be expected to anticipate indefinitely lia-
bility for a product.
Finally, as the twenty-first century approaches, society is becom-
ing increasingly aware of the limited availability of the earth's nat-
ural resources. The days of the "disposable society" are at an end.
As a result, many products, by necessity, will undergo a recycling
process. The dismantling, processing, reusing, and storing of prod-
ucts, as well as the salvaging of parts, must become a foreseeable
use. The law must face the fact that undesirable consequences such
as poisoning, soil contamination, depletion of stratospheric ozone,
and other hazardous results may occur, and must be in a position to
anticipate and control such dangers. Some courts have taken the
unrealistic and antiquated stance that the processing and disposal
of worn-out products is an unforeseeable use, 35 a position that pre-
cludes placing an injured plaintiff in this type of case into the cate-
gory of a user-consumer and, as a consequence, prevents the
utilization of Section 402A. This position, however, is not logical.
Going back to the original reasons for imposing strict product lia-
bility, and acknowledging that there are risks inherent in the dispo-
sal and salvaging of some goods, there is no choice but to place
liability where it belongs. Manufacturers must be held accountable
for loss or harm caused in the foreseeable processing of a product
once it has fulfilled the reason for which it was placed into the
34. Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173, 189 (S.C. 1969) (noting that seller is not re-
sponsible when, after long period of time, product wears out).
35. See Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (finding
dismantling and processing of components not to be reasonably foreseeable use of
product).
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stream of commerce. This accountability could be accomplished in
much the same way that automobile manufacturers are required to
design vehicles that are "crashworthy."
Some people may recall that this accountability was one of the
major debates in product liability law in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The controversy originated with Evans v. General Motors
Corp.,36 in which the court observed that General Motors had
breached no duty in failing to design a safer vehicle because an
automobile was not designed, manufactured, and placed into the
stream of commerce for the intended purpose of participating in
collisions. A contrary position was taken a short time thereafter in
Larsen v. General Motors Corp. ,7 in which the plaintiff had been
killed in a head-on collision. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the defendant-manufacturer was under a duty to provide
a safer means of transportation. The court cited and relied upon
statistics to establish the clear foreseeability of automotive acci-
dents. The court found that most vehicles are involved in at least
one damaging event during their useful lives, and that some of
these accidents cause death to the passengers. The court indicated
that a manufacturer must, therefore, produce a more crashworthy
product, and noted: "The sole function of an automobile is not just
to provide a means of transportation, it is to provide a means of
safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably possible ....,38 This
same analogy can and should be employed in the area of recycling
products. The fact that salvaging procedures will take place is defi-
nitely foreseeable. The manufacturer, therefore, should be held ac-
countable for any resulting harm inflicted during the recycling
process.
It is not inconsistent to recognize that a product has a useful life
and thereby limit the manufacturer's liability once that period has
ended, and at the same time to continue to hold the manufacturer
liable for harm caused during the disposal or salvaging of the same
product. One position deals with a product's effective life-span,
and the other deals with the elimination of the product once its
useful life is over. If in the latter situation there is danger or risk of
harm, the manufacturer must attempt to place a safer alternative
36. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
37. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
38. Larson, 391 F.2d at 502.
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into the marketplace. The manufacturer can accomplish this safety
precaution by using alternate raw materials, developing a safer de-
sign or, at the very least, providing an adequate warning. Finding
liability for harm caused in the disposal or salvage of the product
could be based on the reasonable-expectations analysis or on the
risk-benefit analysis utilized in the area of determining
defectiveness.
XV. CONCLUSION
Much has transpired in the law of strict product liability during
the last twenty-five years. As a result, Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, adopted by the ALI in 1965, does not, as
written, represent the true state of the law today. Many of the
early uncertainties have been eradicated, and the apparent intent
of the drafters has been altered radically by the courts and legisla-
tures. Section 402A has been interpreted and extended far beyond
its original intent. Today, as a result of ingenious lawyers and sym-
pathetic judges, events and individuals not mentioned in the origi-
nal section can find recourse under the law. As a result, we can
restate Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to read
as follows:
(1) One who places into the stream of commerce any product which
is defective in its manufacture, design, or marketing scheme and as
such is in an unreasonably dangerous condition to the user, con-
sumer, or innocent bystander, or to such person's property, is subject
to strict liability for physical harm and perhaps economic loss, and
may be subject to liability for punitive damages thereby caused to
the ultimate user, consumer, or innocent bystander, or to such per-
son's property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of placing
such product into the stream of commerce, and (b) it is expected to
and does reach the user, consumer, or innocent bystander without
substantial change.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies (a) although the de-
fendant has exercised all possible care in the manufacture, design, or
marketing scheme of the product, and (b) although there is a total
lack of privity between such parties.
One can barely imagine what additional changes will occur in the
realm of product liability law as a new generation advances into the
twenty-first century.
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